A facetious complaint among lawyers is that they sometimes have trouble identifying the case they tried below as the one being described in the appellate opinion. That this is even partly true illustrates what everyone knows: that judges much more often disagree on the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn from the facts than on the law.
To give a simplistic answer to a difficult question: the role that the social sciences ought to play in the judicial decision-making process is, of course, the same as the role of any other science, whether medical, electronic, or atomic. In short, all sources of human information and knowledge properly contribute to the determination of the facts.
From Lochner v. New York' to Roe v. Wade 7 and Doe v. Bolton, 8 there has seemingly been little change in the doctrine of substantive due process. But the facts have changed, or if they have not changed, the Court's awareness of the facts has changed-which is to the same effect. From Nebbia v. New York9 until the present, the Court has become increasingly suspicious of its own expertise in economics and increasingly assured of its own competence in the social science areas. And so there has been less and less protection of contract and property interests and more and more protection of personal liberty, including the discernment of rights that are not apparent on the face of the Constitution. 1 0 The Brandeis brief was an innovation in Muller v. Oregon"'i but is now standard operating procedure in equal employment, ecology, and major school desegregation cases. The problem is not whether to use the social sciences, or whether it is proper to do so, but how to persuade the courts of the truth of the ultimate facts asserted. Courts are comfortable with evidentiary facts-how fast the car was being driven-and are uncomfortable with conclusory facts-what caused the tire to blow out. One of the few reasons for wanting to retain trial by jury in civil cases is that difficult questions such as negligence can be left to the jury. Aided by the failure to sustain the burden of proof standard, there is no question too hard for the jury to answer. It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts are uneasy in the presence of the ultimate facts or conclusions of the social sciences because we have many times consumed large quantities of social science- Smith would have cheerfully admitted to being a social scientist, and a distinguished one at that. The burden of his message to his contemporaries, as stated in the first chapter, is that domestic slavery is not sinful and that slavery, per se, is right; "or that the great abstract principle of slavery is right, because it is a fundamental principle of the social state; and that domestic slavery, as an institution, is fully justified by the condition and circumstances (essential and relative) of the African race in this country, and therefore equally right."
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Chief Justice Taney's opinion does not mention Dr. Smith's book, but it is easy to suppose that he may have read it or others like it. In deciding whether Dred Scott was a citizen and entitled to bring a diversity of citizenship action in a federal court, the Chief Justice displayed great interest in "the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time . . . when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted." 1 6 The factual context within which the Court decided the case was, with respect to the status of the Negro, stated to be as follows:' 7 They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as %%ell as in matters of public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion. In September, 1969, there were 2,408 black students and 256 white stu-
he use made of mathematical ratios was no more than a starting point in the process of shaping, rather than an inflexible requirement." 402 U.S. at 25. "If we were to read the holding of the district court to require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole." 402 U.S. at 24.
31. The Fifth Circuit, in Davis, approved a desegregation plan which used a major north-south highway as a dividing line between two school zones. On the east side of the highway lived 94 per cent of the metropolitan area's Negro students. About 88 per cent of the students on the west side of the highway were white. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the basis that every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of desegregation must be explored, including the possibility of the use of bus transportation and split zoning. While not attacking the racial imbalance itself, the Court did imply that a major highway was not to be a barrier to desegregation. See Davis v. Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
32. 429 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970). Because of the small number of whites in Clarendon County, South Carolina, it was feared that unyielding compliance to arithmetical formulas to achieve racial balance would drive whites to the parochial schools. "It will be ironic, and contrary to the spirit of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, [citations omitted] if the result of the application of the Brown constitutional principle in this case is simply to accomplish an all-black school system." 429 F.2d at 822 (Craven, Haynsworth & Bryan, JJ., concurring & dissenting).
On the other hand, while "white flight" was a factor which Judge Sobeloff regretted, he would not attempt to overcome it by a less stringent application of the arithmetic of racial balance. "[Tjhe road to integration is served neither by covert capitulation, nor by overt compromise, such as adoption of a schedule of 'optimal mixing.'" 429 F.2d at 827 (Sobeloff, J., concurring 1358, 1372 (W.D.N.C. 1969) . The earlier opinion indicated that Judge McMillan relied not only on the testimony of experts for this "racial mix" but also on "inferences from the Coleman Report that although mixing a few whites and a heavy majority of blacks retards the whole group, nevertheless mixing a substantial majority of whites and a few blacks helps the blacks to, advance without retarding the whites." 300 F. Supp to insure that Negro and white children in fact go to school together. ' 3 And it still seems to me that some is better than none. Over the past eight years I have observed on my monthly visits to Richmond that it has increasingly become a black city. I said as much in Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond. 4 And I added that "the root causes of concentration of blacks in the inner cities of America are simply not known."41 Perhaps I should have added "by judges." It is true that Dr. Karl Taeuber, a professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, cast most of the blame for the concentration of blacks in Richmond on discriminatory housing policies. 42 But even he admitted that perhaps 15 per cent of existing segregation is attributable to income differentials, and he seemed to attach some weight to what he called "attachments to a particular neighborhood" and "an observable tendency for blacks who can afford better housing not to make, for various reasons, the long jump to a suburban homesite, but rather to move to a peripheral transitional area." 4 The testimony of other social scientists-Dr. Thomas Pettigrew, Dr. Martin E. Sloane, and Dr. Jeanne C. Biggar-were not so precise.
4 4 I share the belief of the experts that housing segregation policy has been an important factor in the creation of the ghetto pattern in the American cities. But I am unwilling to jump to the conclusion that it was the only factor or even the dominant one. Everyone now knows something about alcoholism, and there is emerging a consensus of opinion that we ought not to put drunks in jail so long as they do not harm other persons. Even so, the Court was uneasy with the "findings of fact" below : 4 7
(1) That chronic alcoholism is a disease which destroys the afflicted person's will power to resist the constant, excessive consumption of alcohol.
(2) That a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own volition but under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism.
(3) That Leroy Powell, defendant herein, is a chronic alcoholic who is afflicted with the disease of chronic alcoholism.
The majority was unwilling to use these "findings" as the basis for a constitutional holding that "a person may not be punished if the condition essential to constitute the defined crime is part of the pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of the disease."
48 Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for a plurality of the Court, thought that the Court had too little knowledge to support the announcement of an important and wide-ranging new constitutional principle.
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Just as a raconteur will seldom let the facts interfere with a good story, judges seem to have seldom allowed sociology to interfere with a good theory-until the time of the new idea has come. Sometimes it is a long time coming; but when it arrives, it is then woven into the constitutional fabric. 
